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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION UNDER FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
By C. JOSEPH STETLER*

Six years ago when a series of history-making amendments to
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act were adopted,' little, if any,
thought was given to the possibility that Congress was blazing an
altogether fresh legal trail. The 1962 amendments imposed broad
new affirmative duties on the Food and Drug Administration in
the clearance of prescription drugs for marketing. These duties
were to place the government in a new and unique relationship
with manufacturers. These duties were also destined to raise questions among members of the legal profession as to the potential
liability of the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
actions taken, or not taken, by the FDA in conformity with the
unprecedented congressional mandate to the agency.
Those questions have since been asked but they remain untried and unanswered. There has been no adequate test of the
government's position in litigation which might be brought by patients injured through taking drugs approved by the FDA. For
this reason, it is as timely now, as it was originally, to try to examine the implications of United States drug law as amended, and
the constantly expanding body of regulations stemming from it,
with a view towards possible actions under the Federal Tort
Claims Act in product liability cases.
As a starting point in evaluating the possibility of government
involvement in suits based on drug injuries, it is important to
become acquainted with the factors surrounding the production,
approval and distribution of new drugs.
First, the unique characteristics of ethical drugs seem to require that this class of products receive special treatment in considering whether the general rules of products law should apply.
These drugs are essential to the maintenance of human life and
health, yet by their very nature they can do harm if improperly used
or if the patient reacts adversely. Such harm is not usually related to the purity of the product or to defects in manufacture or
* L.L.B., 1938; L.L.M., 1940, Catholic University; President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association, Washington, D.C.
1. The purpose being: "[T]o protect the public health by amending
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs, authorize standardization of drug names, and
clarify and strengthen existing inspection authority; and for other purposes." 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
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design. Direct sales to consumers is forbidden by law, 2 and the
administration of these drugs inevitably involves the exercise of
discretion by a medical intermediary.
Second, the tremendous strides in scientific progress over the
past thirty years have resulted in the development of a great
number of new, increasingly complex and more selective drugs.
These advances have generated a need to know more about the
dangerous potential of drug products, as well as their benefits.
A natural result has been a demand for more extensive reports
and more comprehensive investigations before a drug is marketed,
from which new and improved techniques for demonstrating safety
have evolved.
Third, attention should be directed to the fact that there is
more government control over drugs than over any other type
of product. In no other private enterprise, with the possible exception of the securities market, have public policies become so
dominant over management's decisions and actions.
Fourth and finally, the usefulness and value of drug products
now available-even those yet to come-have never been of greater
interest to those outside the channels of manufacturing, distributing, prescribing and dispensing than they are at present. Increased
public emphasis on all questions regarding health, a sociological as
well as a political phenomenon, has led to an apparently unquenchable thirst for knowledge of the ways and means by which new
drugs move from the laboratory test tube to the family medicine
chest. What was formerly of concern and importance primarily to
the industry and health professions has now become a matter of
widespread general interest.
MANUFACTURER'S ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DRUGS

A new drug is acquired through innovation, invention or
through the purchase of licensing or patent rights. In either case,
the drug must be cleared by federal authorities prior to being
offered for sale.
In order to obtain clearance, the manufacturer must gather detailed evidence of the drug's safety and effectiveness. The drug is
subject to laboratory analysis, extensive animal testing and finally
to human trials supervised by qualified experts. On the basis of
all such tests-chemical, animal and human-a new drug application is filed with the Food and Drug Administration, requesting
permission to make the medication available to prescribers.
The new drug application must contain: full reports on all
laboratory and clinical investigations; the names and qualifications
of investigators; a list of all ingredients and amounts of each in
the formula; a description of manufacturing procedures; a descrip2.

21 U.S.C.A. § 353 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.A. § 353 (1962).
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tion of tests and checks made to assure purity, strength, and reliability and to prevent errors in manufacture; qualifications of personnel; and samples, labels, and accompanying literature intended
to be conveyed to physicians.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Under the present law and the regulations which have been
promulgated since adoption of the 1962 amendments, the Food and
Drug Administration has authority to police the purity, safety, quality and efficacy of drugs, and to set up guidelines, safeguards and
every segment and operation of the
restrictions over virtually
3
pharmaceutical industry.
The far-reaching extent of the government's current role in
drug regulation is dramatically illustrated by a comparison of the
underlying temper of the original 1938 Food and Drug Act 4 with
the philosophy of the 1962 amendments, 5 and by an examination of
the tightened restrictions which have resulted, particularly with
respect to testing and new drug approval procedures.
In the 1938 Act, Congress defined certain prohibited or misleading practices and made their performance illegal, with a grant of
certain enforcement powers to FDA.6 It was generally recognized
that the drug industry would police itself. By contrast, the 1962
Drug Amendments establish a far stricter and more elaborate
regulatory system. This fact, plus the addition of a great expansion
of control through new regulations, has caused a corresponding
"responsibility spotlight" to be focused on the government. Increasingly, the drug law has shifted away from primary reliance
on sanctions imposed after the fact, toward the establishment of
specific rules in advance and, in some cases, predeterminations of
compliance.
The enormous dimensions of government authority and obligation to oversee the production of drugs was acknowledged by the
FDA at the outset. Soon after the Congressional action of 1962,
an agency publication proclaimed: "These controls over the safety
and integrity 7of our drug supply are the strongest of any in the
world today."
PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCES IN DRUG REGULATIONS RESULTING
FROM THE 1962 AMENDMENTS

The sweeping effects of the 1962 changes in the law become
apparent when they are reviewed against the requirements in the
1938 Act. For example:
3. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392
(1962).

4. Id.
5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

FDA, FACTS FOR CONSUMERS-APPROVAL OF NEW DRUGS, at 2 (1963).
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FDA can prescribe current "good" manufacturing
practices in the name of assuring the safety, identity, strength, quality, and purity of drugs. As a
consequence drugs are deemed adulterated if manufactured under non-conforming methods or in nonconforming facilities.8
(2) Every domestic drug manufacturer and processor
must register annually with the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.9 This is intended to
aid FDA in identifying places where drugs are made
so as to enable it to carry out inspections and to take
action against those failing to register. A related provision of the regulations characterizes drugs from
nonregistered plants as misbranded. A further corollary requirement provides for biennial inspection of
all registered establishments. Foreign drug manufacturers are not required to register, but if they do not,
samples of their imports must be sent to FDA for analysis.' 0
(3) Inspection authority is broadened over establishments in which prescription drugs are produced.
Whereas former
inspection power extended only to
sanitation, 1 the new authority encompasses, with
certain exceptions, "all things bearing on violations
of the Act.' 2 Included within its scope
13 is data relating to qualifications of key personnel.
The 1962 action by Congress also called for profound changes
in supplying drug information to physicians in the advertising of
products. Under the 1938 Act, legal restrictions on drug advertising were enforced by the Federal Trade Commission under statutory authority to prohibit false or misleading claims in all advertising. 14 Drug firms were not singled out and either required to
include or exclude particular material. Nor were they bound by
government regulation as to how they might present their material.
But when the Act was amended, Congress included a brief
provision which empowered the FDA to require that each drug advertisement contain a true statement of information, in brief summary, relating to the effectiveness, side effects, and contraindications of the advertised product. 15 The agency has recently emphasized its authority under this section by issuing new and more
stringent regulations to govern industry advertising. 0 Further,
(1)

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

21
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
33

U.S.C.A. § 355 (1962).
U.S.C.A. § 360(b) (1962).
U.S.C.A. § 381 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (1962).
U.S.C.A. § 374 (1938).
U.S.C.A. § 374 (1938), as amended 21 U.S.C.A. § 374 (1962).
U.S.C.A. § 374(a) (1962).
U.S.C.A. § 331(i),(1)(n) (1938).
U.S.C.A. § 352(n) (1962).
Fed. Reg. 9393-9396 (1968).
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the FDA's tight control over the delivery of product information
to physicians is reflected in its procedure of requiring manufacturers to write "Dear Doctor" letters to physicians modifying claims
for a product which the agency determines are at variance in some
manner with the filed information about the product. The availability of this data may affect drug malpractice cases in the sense
that an added responsibility is placed on physicians to be more
fully informed of the hazards and benefits of drugs.
New drug clearance procedures were also significantly changed
by the 1962 Amendments. The definition of a new drug was
broadened to include the concept of "effectiveness" as well as
safety. 17 Under prior law, the FDA had considered efficacy in
connection with safety,' but the amended law specifically authorized the FDA to require proof concerning efficacy.
In this connection, it is important to note that the law, as
originally written, permitted automatic clearance of new drugs
through a mere lapse of time. 19 Since 1962, however, affirmative
approval of a new drug application (NDA) by the Food and Drug
Administration has been required.20 Drugs could not have been
introduced in the intervening years without positive credentials
from the FDA in contrast to the former permissive entry of a
product into the market for lack of objection. Presumably, in recognition of the agency's added responsibility in this regard, Con21
gress extended the time for FDA action from 60 to 180 days.
And to gain the FDA's approval under the 1962 Amendments, manufacturers must now
submit "substantial evidence" of the efficacy
22
of their products.
Drugs cleared prior to 1962 did not immediately fall under this
requirement but Congress ordered that they be reviewed to establish their efficacy, thus eventually bringing all drugs on the market into compatibility with the law as presently written.23 This is
now being done for the FDA under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences. Involved are about 3,600 drugs which
were introduced between 1938 and 1962.
The Act provides that drugs, never subjected to the new drug
procedures, can be removed from the market upon proof of lack
of efficacy. 24 They can be ordered off the market on efficacy
grounds for changed labeling claims. A corollary requirement, relating to efficacy, permits the FDA to refuse new drug approval
17. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p) (2) (1962).
18. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321 (1938).
19. The application for approval of a new drug became effective sixty
days after filing unless there was a written postponement of such effective
date given by the Secretary. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c) (1938).
20. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c) (1962).
21. Id.
22. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (1962).
23. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(f) (1962).
24. Id.
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if it decides the labeling is false or misleading in any particular.
Immediate suspension of a new drug approval is also authorized
on a finding of an imminent hazard to the public health. 25
Withdrawal from the market of previously approved new
drugs may be required if: (a) new evidence shows a drug to be
unsafe or indicates a lack of substantial evidence of efficacy; (b) a
company fails to make required reports, maintain required records
or refuses access to them; (c) a company fails to correct inadequate
manufacturing
methods; or (d) refuses to correct false or mislead26
ing labeling.
With respect to drugs and antibiotics on the market, a new
reaction-reporting system requires the manufacturer to report
promptly to FDA information on adverse effects and other clinical
27
experience or data relating to safety and effectiveness.
Batch testing and certification is now required for all antibiotics for humans. This was an addition of thirty groups of
antibiotic drugs to the five certifiable before the Act was amended
in 1962.28

Finally, one of the most sweeping changes brought about by
Congress in 1962 involved the testing of new drugs. Under the
1938 Food and Drug Act and subsequent regulations, distribution
of investigational drugs was permitted if they bore prescribed
labeling and were shipped to qualified experts certifying as to their
qualifications and adequacy of facilities. 29 The sponsor of such
drugs was the sole judge of the amount of preclinical testing a
drug received before being administered to human subjects. Under
the present regulations, the FDA has directly intervened in the
preliminary stages of investigation in an affirmative manner. 30
Whereas its former emphasis was placed on passing on the results
of drug research, FDA may now require full information on the
research plan, including animal studies, on the nature of the drug,
on the identify of the investigators, and on the subjects and reports to be submitted as the testing proceeds. With such knowledge, the FDA is in a position to halt testing at any time it elects
to do so, as well as to suggest general methods and procedures,
based upon the criterion of acceptability of final data in a NDA.
Additionally, the regulations now extend FDA control beyond the
drug manufacturer to the clinical investigator.3 1
The 1962 amendments vest authority in the Government over
drug development in other ways. Specified safety conditions must
now be met prior to the testing of new drugs and antibiotics on
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
21 U.S.C.A.
21 U.S.C.A.
21 U.S.C.A.
21 U.S.C.A.
Id.

§
§
§
§

352(n) (1962).
357 (1962).
355(i) (1938).
355(i) (1962).
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humans. These may include: (a) obtaining signed statements
from investigators agreeing that they will personally supervise the
use of experimental drugs and not supply them to others; and
(b) the requirement that the manufacturer keep records and make
reports. 32 The investigator must certify that he will obtain informed
consent from the persons to whom the drugs or controls are to
be administered or from their legal representatives. Such consent
may be waived where not feasible, or when, in the investigator's
professional
judgment, it is contrary to the best interests of the
33
patient.
It has long been apparent that the effect of the 1962 amendments, and the regulations promulgated therefrom in the last six
years, have challenged the adequacy of the FDA's facilities and
manpower. The new compounds which are submitted to clinical
testing each year must be kept under constant surveillance by
the agency. A staggering amount of paper work for agency personnel has resulted from recordkeeping and reports on virtually all
drugs on the market required of manufacturers by the regulations.
Review of NDA's is in itself a gargantuan task. About a year ago
one firm submitted a 14,000 page application for a new product
filling 29 volumes. In triplicate, it required 10 cartons for shipment
and weighed 380 pounds.3 4 The mammoth size which is commonplace for current NDA's is not due to more clinical work, but
rather primarily to the new FDA record keeping requirements.
LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN DRUG CASES

In turning to a consideration of legal precedent for bringing
drug injury suits, it appears that no judicial decision has ever
involved a product's liability action for injury caused by a drug in
its experimental pre-FDA clearance stage. Nor does there appear to
be any reported malpractice decision in this situation.
References to decided product liability and malpractice cases
involving the government, arising from established marketed drugs,
are similarly sparse. With respect to prescription drugs, this is not
surprising in view of the industry's safety record. Between January 1962 and June 1966, only fifteen drugs were withdrawn from
35
the market out of more than 850 being prescribed.
The Government, of course, finds itself defendant from time
to time in malpractice cases involving the alleged misuse of drugs
by federal employees, including physicians, or in federal facilities.
But only once has the government been made a party to a product
liability action and then without the question involving the government having been subjected to judicial determination.
Yet, there
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. V ABBOTT Topics No. 12 (June 16, 1967).
35. American Professional Pharmacist, November, 1967.
36. Meyer v. Searlie & Co., 41 F.R.D. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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is no certainty that this situation will remain quiescent indefinitely as the federal government continues to extend its authority
over the drug industry and to play an increasingly predominant
role in determining precisely what products can be marketed and
the conditions under which they can be produced down to the
minutest detail. A gradual shift in ultimate responsibility from
the proprietor of the assembly line to the bureaucratic decisionmaker is not invisible to the naked eye.
For the present, however, it is necessary to look for analogies
in other areas where somewhat similar government control is exercised.
Over the years, there have been a number of plane crashes
apparently caused by structural failures in flight. Subsequent
litigation to fix responsibility for alleged improper design has involved the fact that the design itself must be "certified" or "approved" by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.37 It was presumed
that if government responsibility is predominant the government
might be held equally, or more liable, than the manufacturers.
In Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,3 a 1958 aircraft suit
brought against the manufacturer, it was alleged that CAA certification constituted nothing more than a determination of conformity with minimum standards of the Civil Air Regulations. A
high official of the CAA, however, testified that certification implied more-a subjective governmental determination that the aircraft was safe. In a 1960 hearing before the Civil Aeronautics
Board, this determination was substantiated by an interpretation
of the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act.
39
Upon analysis of this Act and the 1958 Federal Aviation Act,
it is clear that certification is an integral part of the manufacture
and use of American aircraft. It is not like the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval," but without it, an airplane cannot be sold
or utilized. It attests to the safety of design; it indicates approval of the particular product and also constitutes compliance
with requirements of the Civil Air Regulations, which relate to
every phase of civil aviation. These rules require submission for
review and approval of all basic design data, including all plans
and evaluation tests. Other procedures involve inspection of the
manufacturer's facilities, products and records. The similarity between these requirements and those established by the 1962 Drug
Amendments appears obvious. Further, it would seem that the
important part in the manufacturing process that certification and
approval plays, and the fact that such are required are issues
which may be expected to be raised in future litigation.
With respect to the legal significance of government certifi37.
38.
39.

49 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (1958).
258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et. seq. (1958).
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cation and approval, it was argued in the Prashker case that the
government's prescribed standards were intended to provide full
protection and certification was conclusive evidence that the plane
was reasonably fit for use. This question was not considered by
the court in affirming a directed verdict for defendants, and
there is virtually no case law throwing
light on the definitive
40
effect of government approval of aircraft.
Some clue as to how the courts may react to the question can
be drawn from a case several years ago involving city approval
of clearance intervals for traffic lights.4 1 The city's determination
on the question of driver hazard was upheld on the ground of
expertise. It is important to note that if the plaintiff can show
failure of the manufacturer to make known vital information or
that the information provided was incomplete or insufficient, then
the question of safety passed upon by the government will not be
the same as that presented to the jury.
Another distinction between the effect of government approval
on the one hand, and the effect of approval by the city board in
this case lies in the relative simplicity of the city's task, as compared with a review of the characteristics of a fairly complex
article. In the process of certification or approval, the governmental agency itself may be negligent in failing to obtain sufficient
information, in conducting a faulty administrative review, or in
failing to effect withdrawal from the market of an inadequately
tested product.
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

The question remains whether a person suffering a drug injury would have a cause of action against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act 42-where the drug is experimental or
where it has already been cleared and marketed. This statute, in
brief, subjects the United States to liability for damages for loss,
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of its employees within their scope of employment, if a private
party in a like situation would be liable. 43 The applicable substantive law is that of the state where the injury
occurred, 44 and the
45
statutory time for bringing suit is two years.
Of primary importance is the problem of defining eligible
claimants under the Act. The statute itself does not designate who
40. See, Livesley v. Continental Motors Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.
2d 365 (1951); Boulneaux v. City of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 99 S.W.
2d 557 (1935).
41. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.S.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960).
42. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2674 (1962).
43. Id.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1962).
45. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (1959), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b)
(1966).
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may maintain suits under it. However, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled on this matter several times and in Brooks v. United States46 stated:
The statute's terms are clear. They provide for District
Court jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence
against the United States. We are not persuaded that
'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen.' The
statute does contain twelve exceptions. None exclude
petitioner's claims ....

Without resorting to an auto-

matic maximum of construction, such exceptions make it
clear to us that Congress knew what it was about when it
used the term 'any claim'. . .. 47
In this respect, most of the circuit courts and some of the
district courts which have considered the question of statutory construction have held that the Act should receive a liberal construction in view of its benevolent purpose, 48 and that the exceptions
to the Act should receive a strict construction. 49 This position
has been emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in its
rulings in the prisoner cases of Winston and Muniz v. United
States,50 in which an excellent review of the Act's legislative history is presented. Noting that the government's waiver of sovereign immunity had been qualified by exceptions in the Act, the
Court recognized that none of the exceptions precluded suit against
the government in cases such as the one at bar.51 It once again
reaffirmed its view expressed in prior cases that "the government's
liability is no longer restricted to circumstances in which governmental bodies have traditionally been responsible for misconduct
of their employees. The Act extends to novel and unprecedented
forms of liability as well ...

"52

And, respecting congressional

intent, it referred to its holding in Rayonier v. United States5 3 that
"there is no justification for ...

the Court to read exceptions into

the Act beyond those provided by Congress.

If the Act is to 'be
' 54

altered, that is the function for the same body that adopted it.

It thus seems clear that government action under the 1962
drug law, which is related to personal injury, may come within the
46. 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (injury to serviceman on leave by negligent
operation of Army truck driven by civilian employee).
47. Id. at 51.
48. Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); O'Toole v.
United States, 206 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Campbell, 172
F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949); Jones v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C.
1954).
49. Jones v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1954).
50. 374 U.S. 15o (1963) (injury caused by prison employee's negligence
in delaying medical diagnosis and failure to prevent assault).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 152, citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955); Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1956).
53. Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1956).
54. Id.at 320.
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scope of the Tort Claims Act, for it most certainly does not fall
within the express statutory exceptions.
With respect to the element of duty that must be proven to
sustain a negligence action, many cases have declared that the
primary purpose of the Food and Drug Act is to protect the ultimate consumer from dangerous products coming within its provisions.65 Its safeguards have been held to apply from the moment
of an article's introduction into commerce all the way to the moment of delivery to the consumer.5 6
This position was adopted in a rare Tort Claims case involving
the Federal Pure Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, Anglo-American &
Overseas Corp. v. United States.5 7 Relying on FDA inspection
and release, a wholesaler offered imported tomato paste to the
government in fulfillment of a government contract. It was refused as being adulterated and the wholesaler brought suit for
negligence in the original sampling and inspection. Among other
reasons, his claim was rejected on the ground that the duty imposed on the government by the Drug and Cosmetic Act was one
owing primarily to the ultimate consumer and not an intermediate
dealer.
The government's import sampling activity, which was involved in this case, requires the testing of only such samples as the
government deems advisable. Under the 1962 Amendments, FDA's
new drug approval duty is absolute. On the consumer's part, it
induces reliance that every new drug will be carefully examined
for safety and efficacy before it is permitted to be marketed.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

This brings us to a consideration of the statutory defenses
which the government is likely to assert in drug liability suits:
(1) uniquely governmental activity; (2) discretionary function and
due care; and (3) misrepresentation exception.
First, the Act waives sovereign immunity "under circumstances
8
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable";5
and as if to emphasize this, it further states that the government
shall be liable, respecting tort claims, "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 59
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,1o the government con55.

E.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United

States v. Grayce, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 6 (N.D. Ind. 1954). Analogous cases
hold labels to be tested against danger to ultimate consumer. United States
v. 2 Bags, 147 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1945); United States v. Kocmond, 200 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 924 (1952).

56.

United States v. 4 Devices, 176 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1949); United

States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
57. 144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
58. 28 U.S.C.A § 1346(b) (1958).
59. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948).
60. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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tended that since private persons do not operate lighthouses, the
words must be read as excluding liability in the performance of
activities which private persons do not perform. Thus, there would
be no liability for the negligent performance of "uniquely governmental functions." Answering this argument, the Supreme Court
noted that "while the area of liability is circumscribed by certain
provisions of the Tort Claims Act . . .all governmental activity is
inescapably uniquely governmental"'" and held that it would be
attributing bizarre motives to Congress to hold that it was predicating liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance as
the presence of identical or analogous private activity.
The Indian Towing decision, to all appearances, ended the use
of the fallacious contention of "uniquely governmental functions"
as a defense in Federal Tort Act cases. The Supreme Court in effect
ruled that the government is liable for all activities which it does
not perform with due care and which are not otherwise specifically
excluded by the act itself. The practical effect has been to have
all government acts adjudged strictly according to their negligent
or wrongful nature. Thus, the courts have held the government
liable for negligently conducting a CAA survey 62 and for failure of
Forest Service employees to prevent spread of fire. 6
The exclusion in the Act of causes of action based upon discretionary activities of government employees 64 has caused the
courts a great deal of trouble. This is largely due to statements in
the Texas City explosion case, Dalehite v. United States65 that:
the discretionary function or duty that cannot form a
basis for suit under the tort claims act includes more
than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that the
acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official discretion cannot
be actionable. If it were not so the protection of 2680(a)
would fail at the time it would be needed, that is, when
the subordinate performs or fails to perform a casual step,
each action or nonaction being directed by the superior,
exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.66
It had been thought by many lawyers and commentators that
the decision for the United States in the Dalehite case might possibly indicate a turning point in a previous trend to expand the
concept of governmental suability and liability under the Tort
Claims Act.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 61, 66.
Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (1959).
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
Id. at 35, 36.
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The dissenting opinion, as if anticipating this reaction, expressed the following concern:
It is our fear that the Court's adoption of the Government's view in this case may inaugurate an unfortunate
trend toward relaxation of private as well as official responsibility in making,
vending, or transporting inherently
6 7
dangerous products.

This view received some fortification two years later in Indian
Towing,68 when the majority stated that "it is hornbook tort law
that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby
induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner." Since there was no need to undertake lighthouse
service, the court saw liability and said:
The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light
on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the
guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due
care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then
the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to
discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning
that it was not functioning. If the Coast Guard failed in
the
its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners,
69
United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act.

Indeed, the courts have since made awards in many cases
which seem to involve discretionary functions, where it has
been successfully argued that the category of negligent acts relied
upon in the Dalehite case were made at a planning rather than an
operational level.7 0 There are also many decisions holding that
and
once a government employee or agent exercises his discretion
71
acts, the government is liable for any subsequent negligence.
It would appear logical for the government to assert the discretionary function defense in the event of a suit by virtue of the
1962 Drug Amendments since no one can mandamus the FDA to
approve a new drug application. This was, in fact, the govern73
72
ment's defense in Meyer v. G.D. Searle & Co., alluded to earlier,

in which the government was made a party to a product liability
action involving a prescription drug under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 50.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64, 65 (1955).
Id. at 69.

70. E.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955), aff'd,

221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
71. Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); United States
v. Grey, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952); Grigalauskas v. United States, 195
F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1952), aff'm 103 F. Supp. 543, (D.C. Mass. 196); Costley
v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950); Bulloch v. United States, 133
F. Supp. 885 (D.C. Utah 1955); Rufino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 132
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D.C. Md. 1954).
72. 41 F.R.D. 290 (D.C.N.Y. 1966).

73.

See discussion in text at note 36 supra.
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The complaint was grounded on a claim that use of an oral
contraceptive damaged the plaintiff's heart. It alleged causes of
action against the manufacturer for negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability and misrepresentation, and a separate cause
of action against the FDA for its alleged negligence in acquiescing
to the marketing of the product notwithstanding notice and knowledge to it or the potential dangerousness of the drug and even
though the data submitted by the manufacturer was inadequate;
and in failing to order withdrawal of the drug from the market
on the basis that the drug was unsafe for clinical use, or to otherwise order adequate warnings of danger to accompany the product.
The government moved for dismissal on the grounds that its action
involved the exercise of discretion. The plaintiff found the government's brief "persuasive" and discontinued its action against
74
that defendant.
Far more conclusive are a number of decisions which have
vastly enlarged the sphere of government responsibility and appear to have negated to some extent the asserted discretionary act
exclusion 75 so that it now seems to be limited to those government functions performed on a policy making or planning level.
Functions performed on an operational level cannot, in the light of
these precedents, be successfully used as a basis for denying a cause
of action under the Act even though some discretion is involved.
For example, in a recent case 76 involving the crash of an airliner
and consequent death of several passengers, it was found that the
government was liable when an employee of the Federal Aviation
Agency failed to inform the incoming aircraft of a change in
visibility. This was a violation of an FAA directive that subsequent weather changes, as necessary, shall be transmitted to aircraft.77 By outlining the necessary information, no discretion was
left to the controller as to whether to comply with the regulation
and his failure to do so was sufficient to impose liability upon the
United States. The court said:
When the government decided to establish and operate an
air traffic control system, that policy decision was the
exercise of 'discretion' at the planning level and could not
serve as the basis of liability ....

But once having made

the decision, the government's employees were required
thereafter to act in a reasonable manner. A failure to do
so rendered78 the government liable for the omission or
commission.
74. 41 F.R.D. 290 (D.C.N.Y. 1966).
75. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); United
States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Alexander,
238 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1956); Dalstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th
Cir. 1956); McCormick v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 920 (D.C. Minn. 1958).
76. Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
77. FAA, AiR TRAFIc CONTROL PROCEDURE MANUAL § 265.2.
78. Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 1967).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

Closely allied with the "discretionary function" defense is the
one excluding claims based on the exercise of due care in the execution of a statutory or regulatory responsibility, irrespective of its
validity. 79 The lack of a specific legal standard in the Drug Amendments of 1962 would probably be immaterial since it is likely that
the courts would endeavor to fashion a standard of care to determine whether FDA had met its obligations.
The last defense upon which the government may rely and
the thorniest problem of interpretation the courts have had to
face concerns the "misrepresentation" exception of section 2680(h)
of the Act.80 The record reveals that this section was rarely invoked, as a bar to claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, during the statute's first seven years of existence. The first
important case arose in 1953, and the most recent was decided
February 1967.
The language in the decisions in various cases"' decided from
1953 to 1959 in effect hold that where an act of negligence is coupled with a resultant false misrepresentation on which a plaintiff
relied to his economic detriment, the real cause of injury is the misrepresentation, and accordingly, there can be no recovery. The
decisions in these cases, however, point out the probability of a
different conclusion where a personal injury and a clear duty
owing to the plaintiff exists.
Before such a precedent could become too firmly established
as the proper construction of "misrepresentation," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at a directly contrary conclusion.
In United States v. Neustadt 2 the plaintiff, relying on the alleged
negligent inspection and valuation report of an FHA appraiser,
purchased a house which subsequently developed structural defects.
The lower court found a duty owed to the buyer to perform a
proper appraisal, negligence in performing this duty, and hence
allowed recovery. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the
government was not to be absolved from liability in every case of
wrongful conduct on its part which incidentally involves misrepresentation. If a duty owed was negligently performed, the court
would disregard the fact that negligence became operative through
an incidental communication in itself free from error.
The Supreme Court, for the first time in a case involving the
section 2680 exclusions, granted a writ of certiorari in United States
v. Neustadt 3 and reversed the appellate decision. It squarely
79. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (1959).
80. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1959).
81. Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959); Jones v. United
States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 921, reh. denied,
347 U.S. 940 (1954); Mid Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792
(W.D. Mo. 1953); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144
F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
82. 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
83. Id.
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settled the point that the "misrepresentation" exclusion bars claims
arising out of negligent as well as intentional misrepresentations
and defined "negligent misrepresentation" as the failure "to use
due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which
a party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his
economic affairs. '8 4 The claim was denied on the further ground
that no special duty was owed to claimant, the primary objective of
the FHA appraisal system being to protect the government and
thus being only incidentally to the benefit of prospective home purchasers. There is no warranty or guarantee, since the government
does not approve the building.
The distinction between these misrepresentation cases and potential governmental liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
by virtue of the 1962 Drug Amendments, seems clear. This defense
would probably not be extended to the ultimate consumer suffering personal injury following use of a government "approved"
drug, since a clear duty is owed to him that the government exercise due care in passing on the safety, purity and efficacy of drugs
for which new drug applications are submitted and approved by
the FDA. This is aptly illustrated by the recent decision in Brown
v. United States, 5 an action for damages for personal injury alleging negligence in the government's sale, to plaintiff's employer,
of bomb casings represented to be deactivated. This claim was held
not barred by the "misrepresentation" exception, since bodily injury resulted and, in any event, no representation was made by
defendant to plaintiff but only to his employer.
Further, as herein stated,8 6 none of the other defenses under
the Federal Tort Claims Act appear applicable to exclude the potential claim for negligence by the ultimate consumer.
CONCLUSION

Passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments was an undeniable
milestone in the relationship of the government with an important
American industry, and in direct line with the public which the
industry serves. Vast, virtually absolute powers over the production and marketing of drugs were conveyed to the Food and Drug
Administration, or have been gradually assumed by the FDA
through its own subsequent regulations.
It is a historic principle that with power goes responsibility.
To what extent the government may be required in the years
ahead to accept accountability to the public for its actions regarding drug clearances, commensurate with its authority over the industry, can not be foretold with any certainty at the present time.
84. 366 U.S. 366, 706 (emphasis added).
85.
86.

193 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
See p. 590 supra.
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The legal consequences in product liability cases of government
approval of the product before marketing, which includes the precise warnings which accompany the product, are currently clouded
by doubt and ambiguity. This is clearly unsatisfactory, and increased governmental action in this field can only accentuate the
problem. The present Food and Drug Commissioner has stated that
by 1970 the FDA hopes to be able to say that all drugs on the
market are both safe and effective.87 What legal responsibility
should the agency be expected to bear as a consequence of such
assurances to the public?
Certainly, it seems reasonable to suggest that further consideration should be given to the perimeters of liability when the government undertakes to provide an officially approved product and
warning and the manufacturer has fully complied. If injury occurs
through use of the product and the warning is held to have been
inadequate, it would appear reasonable under the circumstances
for a manufacturer to count on either the equal responsibility of
the government or on complete protection from liability because of
the government's dominating role in permitting the product to
move into the hands of the consumer.

87.

Washington Post, Washington, D.C., July 15, 1968.
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